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Collision Course: How Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23(f) Has Silently Undermined the
Prohibition on American Pipe Tolling During Appeals
of Class Certification Denials
INTRODUCTION
At first glance, the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Calderon v.
Presidio Valley Farmers Association1 is unremarkable. Calderon, a
class action brought on behalf of a group of Mexican farm workers,
arose from numerous alleged violations of the Farm Labor
Contractor Act.2 Although the Western District of Texas initially
denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification, the Fifth Circuit
agreed to hear an interlocutory appeal on the question and, phrasing
its decision diplomatically, “invited” the district court to reconsider
the issue.3 This victory, however, would be short-lived for a small
group of class members.
A group of then unnamed plaintiffs submitted class claim forms
following the Western District of Texas’s decision to certify a class.4
Surprisingly, though, the district court held that the unnamed
plaintiffs’ claims were now time-barred, despite their initial
timeliness.5 Indeed, the unnamed plaintiffs’ claims became untimely
in the period between the initial, erroneous denial of class
certification and the subsequent decision to certify the class.6 The
untimeliness of the plaintiffs’ claims was a result of the rules on
class action tolling, the jurisprudential doctrine which holds that the
filing of a class action suspends the running of a claim’s statute of
limitations against all putative members of the class.7 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed that the tolling effect ceased upon the denial of
class certification and began again when the class was certified.8
Because the plaintiffs failed to intervene in the action or file
independent actions during the period between the initial class
certification denial and its subsequent reversal, the statute of

Copyright 2013, by KEVIN WELSH.
1. 863 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam).
2. Id. at 386.
3. Id. at 389.
4. Id. at 390.
5. Id.
6. See id.
7. See, e.g., Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350 (1983).
The tolling of a statute of limitations is equivalent to a suspension of prescription
under Louisiana law. Compare id., with LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 596 (2012).
8. See Calderon, 863 F.2d at 390.
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limitations continued to run and the claims became untimely.9 Thus,
despite the timeliness of the initial action and appropriate notice to
the defendants,10 the unnamed plaintiffs lost the ability to state a
claim against the defendant solely because the district court initially
and erroneously decided against class certification.11 This situation
is undoubtedly a “worst case scenario” under the widely held notion
that procedure alone should not, without good reason, foreclose on a
party’s ability to argue a claim’s merits.12
The loss that the Calderon plaintiffs suffered is the most
egregious consequence of the widely followed judicial policy of
ending a class action’s tolling effect immediately upon a district
court’s denial of class certification.13 In the past, some courts have
examined the policy and concluded that the realistic costs of tolling
beyond the denial of class certification were simply too high—
tolling would often extend through final judgment, which may come
years after a class certification decision, thereby forcing defendants
to defend stale claims.14 The prospect of multiyear tolling arose
from the historical difficulty of achieving interlocutory review of
class certification decisions.15 However, the entire landscape of
interlocutory appeals in this area was altered in 1998 by the
promulgation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), which
provides a special mechanism for nearly immediate appellate review
of class certification decisions.16 To date, federal circuit courts of
appeal have not responded to the fact that Rule 23(f) seriously

9. See id.
10. A properly pled class action complaint is commonly understood to give a
defendant notice of the type and number of claims that he or she faces. See Am.
Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554–55 (1974).
11. See Calderon, 863 F.2d at 390.
12. See, e.g., TCI Grp. Life Ins. Plan v. Knoebber, 244 F.3d 691, 695 (9th Cir.
2001) (noting that there is an “overriding judicial goal of deciding cases correctly,
on the basis of their legal and factual merits”); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962) (“If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be
a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim
on the merits.”).
13. See, e.g., Stone Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1013 (3d Cir.
1995); Calderon, 863 F.2d at 390; Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d
1374, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc); Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554
F.3d 510, 519–21 (5th Cir. 2008); Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV 1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,
2000); Andrews v. Orr, 851 F.2d 146, 149–50 (6th Cir. 1988).
14. See Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1390.
15. See infra Part I.B.1. The interlocutory appeal in Calderon was an
exception to this general rule.
16. See infra Part I.B.3.
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undermines the logic of ceasing tolling upon the denial of class
certification.17
This Comment argues that the policy of ending tolling
immediately upon the initial denial of class certification contradicts
the very purposes of class action tolling and can lead to prejudicial
results, as Calderon demonstrates. Part I of this Comment examines
the development of class action tolling and the evolution of
interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions. Part II explores
the interrelationship between class action tolling and interlocutory
appeals of class certification rulings by discussing bellwether
decisions on the issue, including the opinions that have linked the
tolling policy observed in Calderon to the historical rarity of
interlocutory appeals. Part III challenges the current jurisprudence
on the grounds that it incentivizes many behaviors that Rule 23 and
class action tolling seek to avoid, fails to recognize the vast changes
in interlocutory appellate practice ushered in by Rule 23(f), causes
litigants to be treated unequally due to an initial, erroneous
certification decision, and fails to protect plaintiffs from Calderonlike prejudice. Part IV of this Comment proposes an alternative
approach to the issue’s current jurisprudential treatment.
Specifically, it argues that tolling should continue through the time
period available for requesting interlocutory review of a class
certification decision under Rule 23(f) and, where a circuit court
grants review, through final resolution of the certification issue. This
proposal, which is based in part on the approach taken by
Louisiana’s Code of Civil Procedure, simultaneously protects
plaintiffs from unnecessary harm, evens the pretrial playing field,
and furthers Rule 23’s goals of efficiency and economy in litigation.
Finally, Part IV contextualizes the proposed rule by assessing recent
scholarship on class action tolling.
I. THE LANDSCAPE
A. The Class Action and Statutes of Limitations
The class action’s defining characteristic is representation.18
Class actions depend on a legal fiction that instructs courts to treat
unnamed class members as if they were named parties in the
action.19 Indeed, Rule 23 “both permits and encourages class
17. See infra Part II.
18. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550 (1974) (“A federal
class action is . . . truly [a] representative suit . . . .”).
19. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Boellstorff, 540 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th
Cir. 2008).
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members to rely on the named plaintiffs to press their claims.”20 The
class action’s representative nature necessarily has consequences for
the running of statutes of limitations—because class actions involve,
by definition, the vindication of a nonparty’s rights, there must be a
mechanism to regulate the application of a statute of limitations to
unnamed class members’ claims. However, the underlying pressures
of class actions and limitations periods are often difficult to manage
in practice.21
1. The Creation of Class Action Tolling: American Pipe &
Construction Company v. Utah
The first effort to reconcile the representative nature of the class
action and the running of statutes of limitations against unnamed
class members came in the 1974 United States Supreme Court
decision American Pipe & Construction Company v. Utah, which
involved claims arising under the Sherman Act.22 In 1964, members
of the steel and concrete pipe industries were indicted by a federal
grand jury for conspiring to restrain their market through collusive
bidding and business allocation.23 Four days after the defendants’
plea of nolo contendere to the criminal charges, the United States
brought civil actions in the Central District of California to enjoin
further violations of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the
False Claims Act.24 After extended negotiations, the United States
and “the companies consented to a decree enjoining them from
engaging in certain specified future violations of the antitrust
laws.”25 A final judgment was rendered on May 24, 1968.26
On May 13, 1969, the State of Utah commenced a class action
against the same defendants for Sherman Act27 violations. Utah’s
suit purported to represent “public bodies and agencies of the state
and local government in the State of Utah who are end users of pipe
acquired from the defendants.”28 The district court found the action
timely because 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) then provided that the statute of
20. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 352–53 (1983).
21. See Mitchell A. Lowenthal & Norman Menachem Feder, The Impropriety
of Class Action Tolling for Mass Tort Statutes of Limitations, 64 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 532, 535 (1996) (“[C]lass actions and statutes of limitation[s] do not interact
harmoniously.”). For an example of another area of contention involving the class
action and statutes of limitations, see infra Part IV.C.
22. 414 U.S. at 541.
23. Id. at 540.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 540–41 (footnote omitted).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 541. Utah brought its action under 15 U.S.C. § 1.
28. Id.
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limitations remained “suspended during the pendency [of an action
by the United States] and for one year thereafter.”29 The class action
was filed with eleven days remaining in the limitations period.30
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1), the
defendants moved for a declaration that the suit could not be
maintained as a class action.31 The district court granted the motion,
finding that the numerosity requirement of Rule 23(a)(1) was not
satisfied.32 On December 12, 1969, roughly seven months after Utah
first filed its action and eight days after the district court rendered its
class viability decision, more than 60 governmental entities from
Utah moved to intervene under Rule 24(a)(2) (intervention of right)
or, in the alternative, Rule 24(b)(2) (permissive intervention).33 The
district court denied the motions to intervene, finding that “the
limitations period . . . had run as to all these respondents and had not
been tolled by the institution of the class action in their behalf.”34
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the intervention denial as a matter of
right but reversed the denial of permissive intervention, rejecting the
district court’s conclusion that the intervening parties were timebarred.35 The Ninth Circuit predicated its decision on the legal
fiction that the intervenors’ claims were filed when Utah initially
brought the class claim eleven days before the limitations period had
run.36 The defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to resolve the issue.37
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s decision on the
issue of tolling.38 The Court began its analysis by examining the
principal purpose of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23.39 Prior to
1966, Rule 23 “contained no mechanism for determining . . . any
point in advance of final judgment which [alleged class members]
were actual [parties that] would be bound by the judgment.”40
According to the Court, “[a] recurrent source of abuse under [pre1966 Rule 23] lay in the potential that members of the claimed class
29. Id. at 541–42 (footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
30. Id. at 542.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 543. To have a class certified, the named plaintiff must demonstrate,
inter alia, that the class device is required because conventional joinder of all
similarly situated plaintiffs is impracticable. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1).
33. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 543–44.
34. Id. at 544 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
35. Utah v. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co., 473 F.2d 580, 584 (9th Cir. 1973), aff’d,
414 U.S. 538 (1974).
36. See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 545.
37. See id.
38. Id. at 561.
39. See id. at 545–46.
40. See id.
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could in some situations await developments in the trial or even final
judgment on the merits in order to determine whether participation
would be favorable to their interests.”41 The Court noted that “[t]he
1966 amendments were designed, in part, specifically to mend this
perceived defect in [Rule 23] and to assure that members of the class
would be identified before trial on the merits and would be bound by
all subsequent orders and judgments.”42 These 1966 changes to Rule
23, which served as part of an overarching revision,43 established the
“opt-out” nature of Rule 23(b)(3) classes.44
Because post-1966 Rule 23 generally binds an unnamed class
member to the named plaintiff’s action unless and until she chooses
to opt out, “the filing of a timely class action complaint commences
the action for all members of the class as subsequently
determined.”45 The legal fiction that a class action serves as an
action on behalf of all putative class members is intended to have
pragmatic benefits—as the Supreme Court explained, “[a] federal
class action is no longer ‘an invitation to joinder’ but a truly
representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage,
unnecessary filing of repetitious papers and motions.”46
After its examination of the nature of the post-1966 federal class
action, the Court addressed the issue of whether Utah’s initial class
action suspended the running of the limitations period for the
putative class members that intervened in the action. The Court held
that “the commencement of the original class suit tolls the running
of the statute for all purported members of the class who make
timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit
inappropriate for class action status,”47 even if the unnamed plaintiff
was initially unaware of the action.48 A “contrary rule” would
“deprive Rule 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of
litigation which is a principal purpose of the procedure.”49 The
41. Id. at 547.
42. Id. (citation omitted).
43. Robert G. Bone & Davis S. Evans, Class Certification and the
Substantive Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1259 (2002).
44. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2) (“[Notice to certify Rule 23(b)(3)
classes] must clearly and concisely state in plain, easily understood language . . .
the binding effect of a class judgment on members . . . .”); Severtson v. Phillips
Beverage Co., 137 F.R.D. 264 (D. Minn. 1991) (“Under Rule 23, all persons
falling within the class definition are considered members of the class, and
therefore bound by the result in the case, unless they affirmatively ‘opt-out’ of the
case.” (citation omitted)).
45. Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
46. See id. (emphasis added).
47. See id. at 553 (emphasis added).
48. Id. at 551.
49. See id. at 553.
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Court reasoned that the new rule was consistent with the ultimate
purposes of statutes of limitations:
The policies of ensuring essential fairness to defendants and
of barring a plaintiff who “has slept on his rights” are
satisfied when . . . a named [plaintiff-representative] of a
class commences a suit and thereby notifies the defendants
not only of the substantive claims being brought against
them, but also of the number and generic identities of the
potential plaintiffs who may participate in the judgment.50
2. The Modern Tolling Approach: Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v.
Parker
Class action tolling, also known as American Pipe tolling,51
reached its current form in the Supreme Court’s 1983 decision
Crown, Cork & Seal Company v. Parker.52 The case arose out of an
employment discrimination dispute between Theodore Parker
(Parker) and his former employer Crown, Cork & Seal Company
(Crown).53 In October 1977, Parker filed a racial discrimination
charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC).54 The EEOC issued a statement that found no reasonable
support for Parker’s claim and informed Parker of his right to sue
Crown under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.55 The notice
to Parker also informed him of a 90-day statute of limitations for the
action.56 Despite the notice, Parker failed to bring a claim against his
former employer within the 90-day period.57
Two months before the EEOC sent notice to Parker of his right
to sue, two former Crown employees initiated a class action against
the company for employment discrimination.58 The class described
in that action, Pendleton v. Crown, Cork & Seal Co., included
Parker and his claim.59 In May 1979, the Pendleton plaintiffs moved
for class certification, but the motion was denied on Rule 23(a)(1)
50. See id. at 554–55 (emphasis added) (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R.
Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)).
51. See, e.g., Caleb Brown, Piped In: The Tenth Circuit Weighs in on
Extending American Pipe Tolling in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.
v. Boellstorff, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 793 (2010).
52. 462 U.S. 345, 347 (1983).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 348.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 347.
59. Id.

1190

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

numerosity grounds.60 Within 90 days of the denial of class
certification in Pendleton, but two years after his original notice of
his right to sue, Parker filed an individual action in federal court.61
Crown successfully moved for summary judgment, with the district
court reasoning that Parker “had failed to file his action within 90
days of receiving his Notice of Right to Sue, as required by the
[act].”62 The Fourth Circuit reversed, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve a growing circuit split on whether one
must intervene in an action after class certification denial to claim
American Pipe tolling.63
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit, holding that
“[w]hile American Pipe concerned only intervenors, we conclude
that the holding of that case is not to be read so narrowly. The filing
of a class action tolls the statute of limitations as to all asserted
members of the class, not just as to intervenors.”64 The Court
reasoned that many of the “same inefficiencies” identified in the
American Pipe decision “would ensue if [the] . . . tolling rule were
limited to permitting putative class members to intervene after the
denial of class certification,” as “[a] putative class member who
fears that class certification may be denied would have every
incentive to file a separate action prior to the expiration of his own
period of limitations.”65 A failure to extend American Pipe to all
putative class members would result in the “needless multiplicity of
actions” that tolling rules were meant to prevent.66 Importantly, the
Crown majority held that “[o]nce the statute of limitations has been
tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative class until

60. See id. at 347–48.
61. Id. at 348.
62. Id.
63. Id. American Pipe, read narrowly, allows “all purported members of the
class who make timely motions to intervene after the court has found the suit
inappropriate for class action status.” Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S.
538, 553 (1974). The Ninth Circuit and Second Circuit held that intervention is a
necessary prerequisite for class action tolling. See Pavlak v. Church, 681 F.2d 617,
618 (9th Cir. 1982); Stull v. Bayard, 561 F.2d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 1977). The Fourth
Circuit held that “the rule in American Pipe is not limited to intervenors but
applies to all members of the class.” Parker v. Crown, Cork and Seal Co., 677 F.2d
391, 393 (4th Cir. 1982), aff’d, 462 U.S. 345 (1983).
64. Crown, 462 U.S. at 350 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
65. Id. at 350–51.
66. Id. at 351; Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553–54 (“[A] rule requiring [a putative
plaintiff’s] successful anticipation of the determination of the viability of the class
would breed needless duplication of motions.”).
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class certification is denied.”67 Crown’s approach continues to
govern the question of class action tolling.68
B. Interlocutory Appeals of Class Certification Decisions and the
Promulgation of Rule 23(f)
In the course of a class action, the most crucial pretrial decision
that a district court makes is whether to certify the purported class—
commentators have described class certification decisions as “the
whole ball game”69 and “the main event.”70 The consequences for
victory or defeat on the question of class certification are often
momentous. For plaintiffs, “denial of certification of a class can
doom the litigation if the representative plaintiffs’ individual claims
are insufficient to make individual litigation economically
feasible.”71 For a defendant, class certification can result in so-called
blackmail settlements72 because successful class certification “can
turn a relatively inconsequential case into one with hundreds, even
thousands, of claimants and carry with it damages upwards of one
billion dollars.”73 Indeed, the pressure to settle after successful class
certification can be so great as to cause defendants to “abandon a
meritorious defense” to avert potential economic catastrophe.74
Despite the class certification decision’s clear importance,
interlocutory appeals of such decisions were historically difficult to
achieve.75 Parties seeking review of a district court’s class
67. Crown, 462 U.S. at 354. See also infra Part IV.C.2.i.
68. See, e.g., Symczyk v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 656 F.3d 189, 200 (3d
Cir. 2011); McClelland v. Deluxe Fin. Servs., Inc., 431 F. App’x 718, 721 (10th
Cir. 2011).
69. PAUL V. NIEMEYER, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES 21 (1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/Reports/CV5-1997.pdf (comments of Guy Rounsaville, Jr.).
70. Id. at 30 (comments of C.C. Torbert, Jr.).
71. Christopher A. Kitchen, Interlocutory Appeal of Class Action
Certification Decisions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): A Proposal
for a New Guideline, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 231, 232 (2004). Such actions
are known as “negative value” class actions, which arise when a plaintiff’s claim
is not large enough to justify proceeding individually. See In re Monumental Life
Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 411 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004).
72. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 18 (comments of John W. Stamper).
73. Kitchen, supra note 71, at 232.
74. Id.; Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).
75. Michael E. Solimine & Christine Oliver Hines, Deciding to Decide: Class
Action Certification and Interlocutory Review by the United States Courts of
Appeals Under Rule 23(f), 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1531, 1535 (2000) (“Until
recently, parties seeking interlocutory relief [from an adverse class certification
ruling] have had few options.” (citation omitted)); Kitchen, supra note 71, at 233
(“Historically, however, there have been few options for parties to appeal a
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certification decision were routinely left waiting through trial and
final judgment, often a multiyear process, for an opportunity to
appeal.76 Though the landscape for interlocutory, postcertification
denial appeals has changed dramatically, the difficulty of achieving
such an appeal prior to the promulgation of Rule 23(f) was a key
factor in the judicial analysis of postcertification denial tolling.77
1. Pre-Rule 23(f) Interlocutory Appeals of Class Certification
Jurisprudence
As a general rule, “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts
of the United States . . . except where a direct review may be had in
the Supreme Court.”78 As a means of encouraging “judicial
efficiency”79 and preventing parties from using delay tactics and
forcing settlements,80 only final decisions from district courts may
be appealed.81 Exceptions in the context of interlocutory appeals of
pre-Rule 23(f) class certification decisions came in three forms: (1)
the collateral order doctrine, (2) interlocutory appeals under 28

certification decision.” (citation omitted)); NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 17
(comments of Patrick E. Maloney) (“[Prior to the promulgation of Rule 23(f),
there was] no effective means for interlocutory review of class certification
rulings.”); Carey M. Erhard, A Discussion of the Interlocutory Review of Class
Certification Orders Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 51 DRAKE L.
REV. 151, 152 (2002) (“Despite its decisive nature, until recently, class
certification determinations were essentially unreviewable until the court ruled on
the merits of the case.”).
76. See Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1390 (11th Cir.
1998) (en banc).
77. Id. at 1389.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006).
79. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974) (“Restricting
appellate review to ‘final decisions’ prevents the debilitating effect on judicial
administration caused by piecemeal appellate disposition of what is, in practical
consequence, but a single controversy.”); see also Erhard, supra note 75, at 152.
80. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Hamilton Cnty., 527 U.S. 198, 203 (1999);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981); see also
Erhard, supra note 75, at 152–53.
81. A final decision or final judgment is “traditionally defined to be a decision
by the district court that ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
court to do but execute the judgment.” See Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at
1547 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S.
229, 233 (1945)); see also Erhard, supra note 75, at 152.
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U.S.C. § 1292(b), and (3) a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a).82
The collateral order doctrine, first articulated in Cohen v.
Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,83 provided that an
interlocutory appeal is available after a class certification decision
when a party can demonstrate that the certification order “[(1)]
conclusively determine[s] the disputed question, [(2)] resolve[s] an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action,
and [(3)] [is] effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final
judgment.”84 The collateral order doctrine’s viability as a means of
attaining interlocutory review of class certification decisions did not
last. A subsequent collateral order doctrine case, Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, effectively prohibited the use of the collateral
order doctrine for interlocutory appeals of class certification
decisions.85
The second method for attaining interlocutory review of preRule 23(f) class certification decisions came through 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b).86 Notably, § 1292(b) requires “dual certification,” as “[t]he
82. Erhard, supra note 75, at 153–55; Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at
1552–61. This list does not include the so-called death-knell doctrine, discussed
infra note 85.
83. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). See also Erhard, supra note 75, at 153 n.9.
84. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (citations
omitted) (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546).
85. See Erhard, supra note 75, at 154; Kitchen, supra note 71, at 237.
Coopers v. Lybrand also put an end to the death knell doctrine. Prior to Coopers &
Lybrand, courts entertained interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions
where “a denial of class certification effectively ends the litigation because the
plaintiffs’ individual stakes in the litigation are too small to litigate their individual
claims.” Erhard, supra note 75, at 153 n.13 (citation omitted). The death knell
doctrine was fraught with pragmatic application issues, as “courts . . . failed to
create any precise test when using these factors to determine when an appeal was
justified.” Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1553 (citation omitted). Indeed,
determining whether an adverse ruling was a “death knell” to a plaintiff’s claim
required an “extensive” case-by-case analysis. Id. “Making such a determination
would often require extensive development of the facts and this raised questions as
to how much of a record had to be developed at the trial court level for future use.”
Kitchen, supra note 71, at 238 (citation omitted).
86. Kitchen, supra note 71, at 240; Erhard, supra note 75, at 154; Solimine &
Hines, supra note 75, at 1550. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) dictates that
[w]hen a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial
ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,
he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals which
would have jurisdiction of an appeal of such action may thereupon, in its
discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is
made to it within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however,
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decision to certify [the class certification question for appeal] is
wholly within the discretion of both the district and the appellate
courts.”87 The dual certification requirement of § 1292(b) creates a
great challenge for parties seeking interlocutory review of a class
certification decision because the statute “requires the blessing of
the very district court that issued the questionable ruling in the first
place.”88 Even when the district court certifies the question for
review, the court of appeals retains total discretion for entertaining
the appeal.89 Courts of appeals may refuse to hear § 1292(b) claims
even for purely practical reasons.90 As a result of § 1292(b)’s
double-hurdle, such “appeals . . . in fact provide review in only a
small fraction of cases.”91
The final pre-Rule 23(f) approach for attaining interlocutory
review of class certification decisions is through mandamus under
28 U.S.C. § 1651(a).92 Mandamus “is something of a last resort” for
interlocutory review because “courts will generally only grant a writ
of mandamus in extraordinary situations, such as where a district
judge has clearly exceeded her authority and there is no other route
to appeal.”93 Mandamus proved to be an ineffective means for
attaining interlocutory review of class certification decisions.94
That application for an appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the
district court unless the district judge or the Court of Appeals or a judge
thereof shall so order.
28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006).
87. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1551 (emphasis added).
88. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 19 (comments of Miles N. Ruthberg).
89. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).
90. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1551 (“[A] court of appeals can deny
such an appeal for any reason, including a congested docket.” (citing Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
91. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 20 (comments of John L. McGoldrick). For
an extensive analysis of jurisprudential attitudes toward interlocutory review under
§ 1292(b) in general, see Michael E. Solimine, Revitalizing Interlocutory Appeals
in the Federal Courts, 58 GEO. WASH L. REV. 1165, 1171–74 (1990).
92. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1551–52; Erhard, supra note 75, at
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006) dictates that “[t]he Supreme Court and all courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”
93. Kitchen, supra note 71, at 241 (citations omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted). See also Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967) (“[I]t is
clear that only exceptional circumstances amounting to a judicial usurpation of
power will justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy.” (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
94. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1551–52 (“As is stated frequently,
however, the writ is no substitute for an appeal.” (citations omitted)); NIEMEYER,
supra note 69, at 19 (comments of Miles N. Ruthberg) (“Mandamus is not
sufficient.”).
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Indeed, a mere “[three] mandamus petitions . . . reached the merits”
in the decade prior to Rule 23(f)’s promulgation.95
2. The Promulgation of Rule 23(f)
Rule 23(f) was promulgated at a time when interlocutory appeals
of class certification decisions were rare.96 The Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules’ (Advisory Committee) reform efforts in the late
1990s did not, however, arise in a vacuum. In 1986, the Section of
Litigation of the American Bar Association (ABA) first proposed
that “the Federal Judicial Code be amended to permit immediate
appeal of class certification decisions, at the discretion of the
appeals court.”97 The American Law Institute and other legal
commentators echoed the ABA’s proposal.98 Nevertheless, the
Advisory Committee’s Rule 23(f), which went into effect on
December 1, 1998, was the first successful effort to reform the
interlocutory review process for class certification decisions.99
Though numerous justifications for Rule 23(f) were given, the
rule’s supporters tended to identify two primary justifications—the
general need for appellate review of class certification decisions and
the concern over district court behavior in an essentially appeal-free
area.100 Advocates for plaintiffs and defendants repeatedly stressed
the need for an effective avenue for interlocutory appeal.101 As
Irving R. Segal stated for the American Association of Trial
Lawyers, “[g]iven the complexity and dynamics of typical class
action procedure, appellate review of class certification by a trial
court is, as a matter of pragmatic fact, a genuine remedy only if the

95. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 20 (comments of John L. McGoldrick).
96. See supra Part I.B.1; see also NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 3–4
(discussing how Rule 23(f) “responds to widespread observations that it is difficult
to secure effective appellate review of class certification decisions”).
97. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1562 (citing Am. Bar Ass’n Sec. of
Litig., Report and Recommendations of the Special Committee on Class Action
Improvements, 110 F.R.D. 195, 210–11 (1986)).
98. Id. at 1563.
99. Id. at 1564.
100. Though class certification could be appealed upon final judgment, class
certification decisions often encourage either the action’s settlement or its
abandonment. See infra Part II.B.
101. But cf. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 22 (comments of Richard A.
Koffman) (“Overwhelmingly plaintiffs oppose and defendants support. This is
clear proof that this proposal favors defendants. That is because it will occasion
delay. Class actions take long enough now. Mandamus and § 1292(b) are
protection enough.”); id. at 14 (comments of Stephen Gardner) (“Defendants
almost always will seek to appeal. Plaintiffs almost never will.”).
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appeal is taken at or shortly after certification.”102 Similarly, Patrick
E. Maloney, representing the Defense Research Institute, stated that
“[a]ll litigants need a method to obtain timely and meaningful
review of class certification orders” because “[t]he certification
order often ends the litigation as a practical matter.”103 Discussing
the benefits of Rule 23(f) for plaintiffs and defendants alike,
commentator Donn P. Pickett noted that “[i]nterlocutory appeal will
provide guidance to plaintiffs who fail to win certification, and
protection to defendants faced with certification of a class with
potential billion dollar damages.”104
Support for Rule 23(f) also arose from concern over district
court behavior when making class certification decisions. Some
proponents merely hoped to see class certification decisions treated
more carefully. For example, John L. McGoldrick of Bristol-Meyers
Squibb urged that “[a] realistic possibility of review . . . may spur
district courts to take certification decisions more seriously.”105
Other Rule 23(f) supporters alleged that district courts were using
the certification process for wholly inappropriate purposes. In the
May 21, 1997, Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
commentator Miles N. Ruthberg claimed that he could “personally
confirm that some courts deliberately wield certification power
precisely in order to pressure settlement—irrespective of whether
the case could ever be fairly tried as a class action.”106
However, some were critical of Rule 23(f). The Advisory
Committee claimed that “[t]he main ground of opposition is that
applications for permission to appeal will become a routine strategy
for increasing cost and delay.”107 The Federal Bar Association
suggested that “[t]he Circuit Courts of Appeals are presently
inundated with cases . . . [and that] [a]dding an additional class of
appeals (even permissive appeals) under these circumstances seems
counterproductive.”108 Nevertheless, Rule 23(f) was successfully
adopted.

102. Id. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted) (comments of Irving
Segal).
103. Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (comments of Patrick
Maloney).
104. Id. at 22 (comments of Donn P. Pickett).
105. Id. at 20 (internal quotation marks omitted) (comments of John
McGoldrick). But cf. id. at 23 (comments attributed to the Chicago Council
Lawyers) (“Indeed, district courts may become less responsible if the locus
responsibility [for class certification decisions] is shifted to appellate courts.”).
106. Id. at 19 (comments of Miles N. Ruthberg).
107. Id. at 4.
108. Id. at 25 (comments attributed to the Federal Bar Association).
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3. Rule 23(f)’s Text, Commentary, and Development
Modern Rule 23(f) provides:
A court of appeals may permit an appeal from an order
granting or denying class-action certification under this rule
if a petition for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit
clerk within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal
does not stay proceedings in the district court unless the
district judge or the court of appeals so orders.109
Rule 23(f) was a direct response to the difficulty of attaining
interlocutory review on the important question of class
certification.110 The comments to the 1998 amendments to Rule 23
reflect the belief that class certification review could, through
appellate discretion, be achieved efficiently and economically.111
Indeed, the comments to the 1998 amendments suggest that the
appellate courts have “sole discretion” in choosing which, if any,
Rule 23(f) appeals to entertain.112 The district court need not “certify
the certification ruling for appeal, although the district court often
can assist the parties and court of appeals by offering advice on the
desirability of appeal.”113
Although its text has been altered since promulgation, Rule
23(f)’s substance has remained constant. In 2007, the text was
altered for purely stylistic reasons.114 The comments to the 2007
amendment reaffirmed the “unfettered discretion” retained by courts
of appeals in granting Rule 23(f) appeals.115 In 2009, the period for
appeal was moved from ten days to fourteen.116

109. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
110. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 4.
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amends.,
subdiv. (f) (noting that concerns about the de facto unavailability of interlocutory
review of class certification decisions “can be met at low cost by establishing in
the court of appeals a discretionary power to grant interlocutory review in cases
that show appeal-worthy certification issues”).
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2007 amend. (“The
language of Rule 23 has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil
Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and terminology
consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only.”).
115. Id.
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 2009 amends. (“The time
set in the former rule at 10 days has been revised to 14 days.”).
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4. The Application of Rule 23(f)
Since the rule’s promulgation, federal courts and legal scholars
have come to numerous conclusions as to when a Rule 23(f) appeal
should be heard.117 Some circuit courts have shown greater
willingness to hear Rule 23(f) appeals than others, creating forumshopping concerns.118 One of the most notable consequences of
Rule 23(f)’s promulgation is the increased rate at which circuit
courts entertain interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions.
In 2002, Carey M. Erhard performed an extensive empirical
analysis on circuit court behavior in Rule 23(f) appeals.119 Professor
Erhard’s data suggest that interlocutory appeals of class certification
decisions are significantly more likely to be heard due to the
enactment of Rule 23(f).120 Between Rule 23(f)’s promulgation in
December of 1998 and July of 2002, a period of roughly three and a
half years, the circuit courts published a combined 40 Rule 23(f)
opinions.121 Of the 40 opinions, 33 of them reached the merits of the
appeal; the other seven opinions were written reasons for denying a
requested appeal.122 These data do not suggest that circuit courts are
entertaining over 75% of the appeals requested because the study
did not track unpublished denials of Rule 23(f) requests.123 The 33
Rule 23(f) appeals that the circuit courts entertained in a three and a
half year period signify a nearly twofold increase from the number
of appeals (18) entertained in the decade before Rule 23(f)’s
enactment.124 Erhard’s data also suggest that, in the first three years
after Rule 23(f)’s promulgation, the frequency of published Rule
23(f) opinions increased every year.125

117. See generally Charles R. Flores, Appealing Class Action Certification
Decisions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f), 4 SETON HALL CIRCUIT
REV. 27 (2007); Aimeee G. Mackay, Appealability of Class Certification Orders
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(f): Toward a Principled Approach, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 755 (2002); DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, FOURTH § 21.2, at 372 (4th ed. 2008).
118. Erhard, supra note 75, at 174.
119. Id. at 171–74.
120. See id.
121. Id. at 173.
122. See id. at 184–87 (Table 1).
123. See id. at 173 n.210.
124. Compare id. at 184 (Table a1), with NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 20
(comments of John L. McGoldrick).
125. See Erhard, supra note 75, at 171–72.
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II. TYING THE KNOT: CLASS ACTION TOLLING AFTER A DISTRICT
COURT’S DENIAL OF CLASS CERTIFICATION
The relationship between class action tolling and the
interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions is not always
apparent; the pre-Rule 23(f) decisions of American Pipe and Crown
do not explore the possibility of tolling during interlocutory appeals.
Moreover, Rule 23 does not expressly contemplate class action
tolling. Yet, the relationship between the two has received attention
in jurisprudence and, to a much lesser extent, scholarly literature.126
The circuit courts have held with practical uniformity that class
action tolling ceases upon a district court’s denial of class
certification, irrespective of an interlocutory appeal or an appeal
following final judgment.127 Only two federal district courts have

126. See, e.g., Stone Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1355
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Nelson v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 60 F.3d 1010, 1013 (3d Cir.
1995); Calderon v. Presidio Valley Farmers Ass’n, 863 F.2d 384, 390 (5th Cir.
1989); Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998)
(en banc); Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 519–21 (5th Cir.
2008); Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV
1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1–2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000); Andrews v. Orr, 851
F.2d 146, 149–50 (6th Cir. 1988); Bobbitt v. Milberg, LLP, No. CV-09-629-TUCFRZ, 2010 WL 5345867, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010); Monahan v. City of
Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004 WL 758342, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 30,
2004); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., 601 F. Supp. 2d 809, 827
(E.D. La. 2009); Arivella v. Lucent Technologies, Inc., 623 F. Supp. 2d 164, 174–
75 (D. Mass. 2009); Giovanniello v. ALM Media, LLC, 660 F.3d 587, 589 n.1 (2d
Cir. 2011). For examples of scholarly coverage on the issue, see 1 JOSEPH M.
MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3:15 (7th
ed. 2011); 3 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG,
NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 7:38 (4th ed. 2002 & Supp. 2012).
127. See, e.g., Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1355; Nelson, 60 F.3d at 1013;
Calderon, 863 F.2d at 390; Taylor, 554 F.3d at 519–21; Armstrong, 138 F.3d at
1390; Andrews, 851 F.2d at 149–50. But see Jimenez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d
689, 696 (7th Cir. 1975) (“In this case we have no doubt that the filing of the
complaint tolled the statute at least until the date of the three-judge district court
decision on the merits. If that decision had expressly refused to certify the case as
a class action, we think the tolling would have continued if the plaintiffs had
appealed from such a ruling, but probably would not have continued if they had
acquiesced. Therefore, if the district court’s failure to address the class action issue
is construed as an adverse ruling, the plaintiffs’ failure to raise that issue on appeal
to the Supreme Court would defeat the unnamed plaintiffs’ claims.”). Jimenez was
decided prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Crown and before the
promulgation of Rule 23(f). The Seventh Circuit’s dicta have not generated
support, and its decision was treated negatively by the Eleventh Circuit. See
Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1384.
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published opinions that partially challenged the appellate courts on
this issue.128
A. Bellwether Appellate Opinions on Tolling After Certification
Denial
As previously noted, numerous circuit courts have addressed the
issue of tolling following the denial of class certification.129
However, two opinions stand out—the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in
Taylor v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,130 and the Eleventh Circuit’s
opinion in Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corporation.131 Both
opinions offer more comprehensive analyses of the question than do
comparable decisions from other circuit courts. The decisions serve
as bellwethers for other reasons as well. Taylor is the most recent
published appellate decision on this issue. Armstrong is relevant
because it was handed down months before Rule 23(f)’s
promulgation, and the court discussed the manner in which the then
proposed rule could change the landscape of tolling postcertification
denial.132
1. Taylor v. United Parcel Service, Inc.—The “Representation”
Justification
On March 19, 2003, Elton Taylor (Taylor) brought suit against
his employer, United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS) for employment
discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981.133 Prior to his 2003 action, Taylor was a putative plaintiff in
a class action filed on June 17, 1994, Morgan v. United Parcel
Service of America, Inc.,134 “alleging race discrimination in
employment by UPS.”135 The plaintiffs’ claims in Morgan were
dismissed through summary judgment on June 26, 2000, and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.136 Taylor’s

128. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1–2; Monahan, 2004
WL 758342, at *2.
129. See supra note 126.
130. 554 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2008).
131. 138 F.3d 1374, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
132. See id. at 1389 n.35.
133. Taylor, 554 F.3d at 513–14.
134. 143 F. Supp. 2d 1143 (E.D. Mo. 2000), aff’d, 380 F.3d 459 (8th Cir.
2004).
135. Taylor, 554 F.3d at 513.
136. Id.
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individual claims under federal law largely matched those in the
Morgan class action.137
In April of 2005, UPS moved for summary judgment against
Taylor.138 The Western District of Louisiana granted the motion in
part, holding that a number of the statutes of limitations had run for
the claims originally made on behalf of Taylor in Morgan, including
the claims under Title VII.139 Specifically, the court rejected
Taylor’s contention that the Morgan claims’ statutes of limitations
were tolled between the June 2000 grant of summary judgment and
the Eighth Circuit’s August 2004 decision affirming the
dismissal.140
The Fifth Circuit reversed the Western District of Louisiana on
tolling, holding that “Taylor’s claims were tolled until August 30,
2004, when the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order in
Morgan.”141 Notably, though, the court drew a sharp distinction
between tolling after an adverse summary judgment in a class action
and the outright denial of class certification.142 Indeed, the court
wrote at length about the impropriety of continued tolling beyond
certification denial.143
After discussing American Pipe and Crown, the court held that
“it is clear from these cases that if the district court denies class
certification under Rule 23, tolling of the statute of limitations
ends.”144 For the Fifth Circuit, the central question was one of
continued representation; discussing the question of representation
after class certification denial, the court held that
[i]n those cases [of class certification denial], the district
court’s refusal to certify the class was tantamount to a
declaration that only the named plaintiffs were parties to the
suit. Thus, those cases logically concluded that after the
137. See id. at 514. Taylor also alleged that UPS had retaliated against him for
participating in the Morgan action.
138. Id.
139. See id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 521.
142. Id. (“In sum, because the Morgan district court did not deny class
certification, American Pipe, Crown, Cork & Seal, and Calderon are inapposite.
Because Taylor remained a member of a certified class while Morgan was on
appeal, he was entitled to assume that the class representatives continued to
represent him and protect his interests in appealing the order dismissing the class
claims on the merits. This is consistent with the general rule that all members of a
certified class enjoy the same rights as individually named plaintiffs in the suit.”).
143. Id. at 517–21.
144. Id. at 519. The court also cited Calderon for the same proposition. See id.
(“Calderon therefore establishes that the denial of certification ends the tolling
period without regard to any appeal from that decision.”).
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district court’s denial of certification, the putative class
members had no reason to assume that their rights were
being protected. Stated differently, they were notified that
they were no longer parties to the suit and they should have
realized that they were obliged to file individual suits or
intervene in the class action.145
The court came to the opposite conclusion for tolling after an initial
grant of summary judgment in a class action, holding that
[class members facing adverse summary judgment are]
entitled to assume that the class representatives continued to
represent [them] and protect [their] interests in appealing the
order dismissing the class claims on the merits. This is
consistent with the general rule that all members of a
certified class enjoy the same rights as individually named
plaintiffs in the suit.146
Two district courts have echoed the conclusion that putative class
members are not entitled to rely on the named plaintiffs following
class certification denial.147
The Fifth Circuit’s reasoning was predicated on the class
action’s special, representative nature.148 A district court’s denial of
class certification is especially significant because the putative
plaintiffs “were notified that they were no longer parties to the
suit.”149 The court placed the onus to act on the putative plaintiff
because she “should have realized that [she was] obliged to file [an]
individual suit[] or intervene in the class action;” it was no longer
reasonable for a putative plaintiff to rely on the named plaintiff in
the action.150 The Fifth Circuit did not address Rule 23(f)
specifically151 and did not consider a putative plaintiff’s reliance on
an appeal well founded in general.152 Moreover, the determinative
145. Id. at 520 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 521.
147. See Bobbitt v. Milberg, LLP, No. CV-09-629-TUC-FRZ, 2010 WL
5345867, at *4–5 (D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2010); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol.
Litig., 601 F. Supp. 2d 809, 827 (E.D. La. 2009).
148. See Taylor, 554 F.3d at 520.
149. See id.
150. See id. (citing Edwards v. Boeing Vertol Co., 717 F.2d 761, 766 (3d Cir.
1983) (suggesting that it is reasonable for a putative plaintiff to rely on the named
plaintiff after an adverse ruling on the merits but not after an adverse class
certification decision)).
151. As did the Eleventh Circuit in Armstrong. See infra Part II.A.2.
152. See Taylor, 554 F.3d at 520 (“Calderon therefore establishes that the
denial of certification ends the tolling period without regard to any appeal from
that decision.”).
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factor for disallowing tolling after certification denial is the district
court’s “declaration” that the named plaintiff only represents
herself.153
2. Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp.—The Pre-Rule 23(f)
“Pragmatic” Justification
Armstrong arose from a class action filed pursuant to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act154 by former Martin Marietta
employees.155 As in Crown,156 the plaintiffs attained the right to sue
upon the receipt of notice from the EEOC; the relevant statute of
limitations began to run against the plaintiffs upon receipt of the
notice of their right to sue.157 On June 4, 1993, nearly every
Armstrong plaintiff opted in to an already-filed class action against
Martin Marietta158 called Carmichael v. Martin Marietta
Corporation.159 On April 7, 1994, the Middle District of Florida
held that the Armstrong plaintiffs “were not similarly situated to the
other Carmichael plaintiffs” and excluded them from the class.160
On October 11, 1994, “more than ninety days after the Carmichael
court’s partial denial of class certification,” the plaintiffs in
Armstrong filed their own class action against their former
employer.161 In its successful motion for summary judgment, Martin
Marietta claimed that the plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred
because more than 90 days had elapsed since the plaintiffs were
excluded from the Carmichael class.162
In the last major appellate opinion on the issue prior to the
promulgation of Rule 23(f), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.163 After
assessing the cases of American Pipe and Crown, as well as the
Supreme Court’s decision in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,164
153. See id.
154. 29 U.S.C. § 621–634 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
155. Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1378 (11th Cir.
1998) (en banc).
156. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 347 (1983).
157. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1378–79.
158. The plaintiffs had to “opt in” because of the complications arising from
requiring an EEOC right-to-sue confirmation. See id. at 1392.
159. Id. at 1379.
160. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1379–80.
163. Id. at 1394.
164. 432 U.S. 385 (1977). This case dealt with a putative plaintiff who had
intervened following class certification denial and a settlement between the named
plaintiff and United Airlines for the sole purpose of challenging the class
certification decision. Id. at 392. The court held that the intervention was proper
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and expressing doubt that the Supreme Court intended tolling to
continue beyond a district court’s denial of class certification,165 the
court rested its conclusion largely on “practical considerations.”166
The court first discussed the great difficulty of attaining
interlocutory review of class certification decisions.167 Noting that
interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions are “relatively
uncommon and are very rarely successful,” the court held that a
putative plaintiff’s “reliance on the possibility of reversal [of an
adverse class certification decision] upon an interlocutory appeal is
unreasonable.”168 Disputing an argument made by a dissenting
judge, the court explained that extending class action tolling through
the appeals process “would often toll the statute of limitations
through a final judgment [and complex, multi-issue appeals], a
process that can take years[,] on the off chance that a few filings will
be saved by the slim prospect of a successful appeal.”169 The
Armstrong court also held that a tolling extension through the
appeals process is incompatible with the litigation strategies used in
modern class actions.170 For example, the court found the extension
of tolling beyond the denial of class certification irreconcilable with
the oft-used plaintiff strategy of settling claims quickly after an
adverse ruling on class certification.171 Next, the court noted the
difficulty of determining when tolling would cease:
When, [after class certification is denied], does the statute of
limitations resume running? When the stipulation of
dismissal or the final judgment is entered? After appeal by
the named plaintiffs (who now have little incentive to pursue

because the motion was made within the “time limitation for lodging an appeal”
following a final judgment. Id. at 392–95. Further, the defendants were on notice
for the appeal because the named plaintiffs had requested interlocutory relief
before settling. Id. at 393–94.
165. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1380–84.
166. See id. at 1385–91.
167. Id. See also supra Part I.B.1–2.
168. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1389 (footnote omitted).
169. Id. at 1389–90 (footnote omitted). In a different portion of the opinion, the
court stated that such multiyear tolling during the appeals process “contravene[s]
the policies underlying statutes of limitations” because “[s]tatutes of limitations
are intended to prevent the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber
until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have
disappeared.” Id. at 1388 (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express
Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49 (1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
170. See id. at 1390.
171. See id. There is wisdom in this position because it follows that a putative
plaintiff cannot reasonably rely on a former named plaintiff that has dismissed his
or her claims against the defendant.
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years of appeals)? And what if disappointed putative class
members seek to intervene, as in United Airlines, for the
purpose of appeal? Should they be given the benefit of years
of continued tolling, despite the fact that their chances for
success on appeal are terribly slim? This is not idle nitpicking.172
The court reasoned that ending tolling when the circuit court denied
certification struck a reasonable balance between the rights of
plaintiffs and defendants:
The earlier the event that triggers the resumption of the
limitations period—say, the joint stipulation of dismissal—
the greater the potential for prejudicial surprise of excluded
putative class members. The later that event—say, the final
failure of an appeal by intervening putative class members—
the greater the potential that cases will grow stale.173
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the notion that putative
plaintiffs were bereft of protection following an adverse class
certification ruling:
The appellants argue that the rule we adopt will force
disappointed putative class members to choose between 1)
filing an individual lawsuit within the statute of limitations
period or 2) exercising their right to appeal the denial of
class certification. This does not have to be the case. A
putative class member who wishes to preserve both rights
should file her individual suit and immediately seek a stay of
the individual suit pending the outcome of an appeal from
the denial of class certification. If, in the judgment of the
district (or state) court to whom the application for a stay
has been made, the plaintiff’s hopes for reversal of the initial
denial of class certification are strong, and if the delay
caused by the stay will not be too great, the court may, in its
discretion, grant the stay; if the court believes that the
chances of reversal are slim or the delay caused by waiting
for the appellate process to conclude will be too long (as will
usually be the case), the stay will properly be denied, and the
plaintiff will properly have to proceed individually. This is a
just, efficient result.174

172. Id.
173. Id. (footnote omitted).
174. Id. at 1391 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).

1206

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

At the time the case was decided, Rule 23(f) had been proposed
but not adopted.175 The court noted that the rule had the potential to
alter substantively its pragmatic calculus. Specifically, the court
posited:
If the rule passes, and if it significantly increases the
frequency of interlocutory appeals of class certification
orders—a development which would depend in large part
upon how this court chooses to exercise the discretion
granted to it by the proposed rule—then we may revisit the
decision taken today, and might for instance allow continued
tolling of statutes of limitations during the pendency of an
appeal under the new rule.176
The majority expressly refused to “speculate . . . how we might
exercise our discretion under the proposed rule and to decide the
instant case in reliance upon an as-yet un-enacted rule.”177 The court
also suggested that a stay of proceedings did not have the effect of
restarting tolling, irrespective of Rule 23(f)’s enactment.178 Other
courts have come to the opposite conclusion on a stay’s tolling
effect.179 Whether stays have the effect of recommencing tolling
remains an open question.180
B. Dissenting Voices
The Armstrong court conceded that Rule 23(f) had the potential
to affect, if not reverse, the rule that tolling ceases upon class
certification denial.181 Despite the rule’s successful promulgation,
however, circuit courts of appeals have not wavered from the pre-

175. See id. at 1389 n.35.
176. Id. (emphasis added).
177. Id.
178. Id. (“In the absence of guidance, we do not hold that a stay of a district
court’s order denying certification would toll the limitations period, either under
the proposed rule or under the law controlling our decision today.”).
179. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV
1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000) (“A stay in the matter
of National Asbestos Workers Medical Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc. tolling the
statute of limitations period pending the outcome of an interlocutory appeal is
granted.”); Monahan v. City of Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004 WL
758342, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2004) (“Accordingly, the Court concludes that its
stay of the proceedings pending appeal of the denial of class certification
continued the tolling of the statute of limitations for the proposed plaintiffs’
claims.”).
180. Stays in this context are discussed infra Part II.B.
181. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1389 n.35.
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Rule 23(f) Armstrong rule.182 Two district courts have, however,
questioned the reasoning of cases like Taylor and Armstrong.
1. National Asbestos Workers Medical Fund v. Philip Morris,
Inc.
On September 26, 2000, the Eastern District of New York issued
an order that directly discussed the Eleventh Circuit’s Armstrong
opinion and, more generally, the wisdom of ceasing tolling upon a
district court’s denial of class certification.183 The September 26
order came on the heels of a class certification denial.184 The named
plaintiff appealed the decision under Rule 23(f).185 The order was
granted due to concerns “about the effect of [then two-year old Rule
23(f) on] the running of the statute of limitations pending [an
interlocutory] appeal.”186
The court issued a stay of proceedings to toll the relevant statute
of limitations, holding that “a limited stay is justified” as a means of
ensuring “that members of the class and defendants as well as the
courts are not unnecessarily burdened by individual suits to protect
statute of limitations tolling rights prior to the appellate decision.”187
In granting the stay, the court recognized that “[p]rior to the
December 1998 enactment of Rule 23(f), courts followed a
reasonableness standard in determining when the statute of
limitations would start to run in a class action,” and “[t]olling ended
when it was no longer reasonable for the putative class members to
rely” on the named plaintiffs.188 Nonetheless, the reasonability of a
putative plaintiff’s reliance on the named plaintiff was affected by
Rule 23(f)’s promulgation, which “signaled a new regime allowing
putative class members to more easily obtain interlocutory appeals
on the issue of class certification.”189 Thus, the court reasoned that
“[t]he policies undergirding the adoption of Rule 23(f) suggest . . .
182. See, e.g., Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 521 (5th Cir.
2008). One post-Rule 23(f) case acknowledged that Armstrong may be obsolete;
however, the court declined to discuss Rule 23(f)’s effects on tolling because the
rule is not allowed in actions in the Court of International Trade. Stone Container
Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
183. Nat’l Asbestos Workers, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1.
184. Id.
185. See id. at *2.
186. See id. at *1.
187. Id. (citations omitted). The court qualified its “justification” for the stay
by recognizing the lack of post-Rule 23(f) appellate jurisprudence. See id. (“[A]
limited stay is justified—at least pending clarification of Rule 23(f) practice.”).
188. Id. (citing Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1390 (11th
Cir. 1998) (en banc)).
189. See id.
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that the statute of limitations should be tolled where a party files an
interlocutory appeal and the district court grants a stay.”190
The court justified its limited tolling extension through a stay on
two grounds.191 First, the court noted that a Rule 23(f) appeal could
result in the “prompt revival of the class action.”192 Because of the
potential for a rapid reversal of a district court’s certification
decision, a toll-inducing stay should be rendered by a district court
when a Rule 23(f) appeal is made to encourage putative plaintiffs to
continue to rely on the named plaintiff’s action.193 Second, the court
held that equity supports a stay because the harm a defendant would
suffer waiting through an “expedited appeals process” is far less
than the harm a putative plaintiff would face if her claim became
time-barred in the period between a denial of class certification and
a Rule 23(f) ruling.194 It is worth noting that this district court never
directly questioned the viability of Armstrong post-Rule 23(f).
Instead, the court held that tolling should continue only where a
Rule 23(f) appeal is perfected and a stay is entered by the district
court.195
2. Monahan v. City of Wilmington
On May 19, 2000, numerous members of the Wilmington Police
Department filed a class action against their employer alleging
violations of federal law.196 On July 31, 2001, the District of
Delaware denied class certification.197 The plaintiffs successfully
obtained a stay from the district court and appealed under Rule
23(f).198 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District of
Delaware’s decision on March 28, 2003.199 After the plaintiffs
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. The tolling extension is limited insofar as tolling continues if a Rule 23(f)
appeal is actually filed and if the district court grants a stay. See id.
192. Id. at *2.
193. See id. The court’s argument is in line with the American Pipe Court’s
goal of fostering reliance by unnamed class members on the named plaintiff. See
Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 550–53 (1974).
194. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers, 2000 WL 1424931, at *2. A ruling on a Rule
23(f) appeal could come in the form of a decision on the merits of the district
court’s certification decision or in the form of a denial to entertain the appeal
whatsoever. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 23(f).
195. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1.
196. Monahan v. City of Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004 WL
758342, at *1 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2004). Plaintiffs stated claims under, inter alia, 42
U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985.
197. Monahan, 2004 WL 758342, at *1.
198. Id. at *1–2.
199. Id. at *1.
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brought a second action against the city, the Wilmington Police
Department claimed that the district court’s 2001 denial of class
certification ceased the tolling of the relevant statutes of limitations,
resulting in time-barred claims.200
The District of Delaware, like the Eastern District of New York,
held that tolling continues after class certification denial as long as a
plaintiff takes a Rule 23(f) appeal and obtains a stay.201 The court
recognized the pre-Rule 23(f) jurisprudence202 but decided to follow
the National Asbestos Workers decision.203 Noting the permissive
nature of Rule 23(f) and its purpose of promoting rapid review of
district court certification decisions, the court reasoned that the
danger of a lengthy, prejudicial tolling period was greatly
reduced.204 Thus, the court reasoned that “Rule 23(f) provides a
reasonable basis for putative class plaintiffs to continue to rely upon
a filed class action to redress their individual claims pending an
appeal of a denial of class certification.”205
III. CHALLENGING THE CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Appellate Courts’ Denial of Tolling After Certification
Denial
1. The “Representative” Justification of Taylor v. United Parcel
Service, Inc.
In holding that a denial of class certification is “tantamount to a
declaration that only the named plaintiffs were parties to the suit”
and that putative plaintiffs are not entitled to rely on named
plaintiffs after a district court’s class certification decision,206 the
Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Taylor v. United Parcel Service, Inc.
perpetuates the possibility of a Calderon-like ejection from an
action, ignores American Pipe’s policy goals, and creates an
unnecessary Catch-22 for plaintiffs after a class certification denial.
200. Id. at *2.
201. Id.
202. The court specifically recognized Nelson v. Allegheny County, 60 F.3d
1010 (3d Cir. 1995), and Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corporation, 138 F.3d
1374, 1390 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc). Monahan, 2004 WL 758342, at *2.
203. Monahan, 2004 WL 758342, at *2
204. See id.
205. Id. (citation omitted) (citing Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip
Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV 1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,
2000)).
206. See Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 520–21 (5th Cir.
2008).
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Moreover, the Taylor court completely fails to address Rule 23(f)’s
stated purposes. Indeed, the result of the Fifth Circuit’s approach
undermines the fundamental goals of Rule 23 while prejudicing
putative plaintiffs.
Perhaps the central purpose of American Pipe tolling is the
encouragement of reliance on the named plaintiffs in an action;
without putative plaintiff reliance through tolling, Rule 23 would be
deprived of “the efficiency and economy of litigation” that its
drafters and Congress intended.207 Yet the Fifth Circuit’s Taylor
holding that a putative plaintiff may not rely on a named plaintiff
after an adverse certification ruling encourages litigants to act
inefficiently. Under the Taylor approach, a putative plaintiff risks
being time barred if she simply decides to rely on the named
plaintiff to appeal an adverse certification ruling—the ultimate
inability of the plaintiffs to pursue their claims in Calderon v.
Presidio Valley Farmers Association confirms the danger of such
reliance. To mitigate the risk of losing litigious rights while
monitoring the appeals process, a putative plaintiff has a strong
incentive to file an independent action as soon as class certification
is denied.208 Such independent actions could be abandoned en masse
when a subsequent decision overturns the initial class certification
decision.209 Indeed, this type of protective filing represents the exact
behavior that class action tolling was meant to end.210 As such, the
Fifth Circuit’s policy of ending tolling upon class certification denial
creates an inexorable problem—either plaintiffs must endure the
running of statutes of limitations and perhaps lose their claims, or
they must flood the courts with “placeholder” actions in
contravention of the policies underlying American Pipe and Rule
23.211 Neither result is acceptable.
207. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974).
208. Indeed, this appears to be the Eleventh Circuit’s recommendation. See
Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1391 (11th Cir. 1998) (en
banc). In a large action, this strategy could result in thousands of individual
actions. The Taylor court made no effort to reconcile this strategy’s consequences
with the Supreme Court’s desire to reduce redundant actions. See Am. Pipe, 414
U.S. at 550. The Eleventh Circuit, discussing the issue in a pre-Rule 23(f) context,
held that the rule would result in some “unnecessarily costly litigation,” but tolling
through final judgment was an unacceptable means of avoiding such a result. See
Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1388. After Rule 23(f), the need for tolling through final
judgment no longer exists. See infra Part III.A.2.
209. Including, but not limited to, a Rule 23(f) appeal.
210. See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550 (noting that the class action is “a truly
representative suit designed to avoid, rather than encourage, unnecessary filing of
repetitious papers and motions”); Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S.
345, 350–51 (1983).
211. See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 550.
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More fundamentally, the Fifth Circuit’s position that the denial
of class certification serves as a declaration212 that only the named
plaintiff remains a party to the action fails to recognize the Advisory
Committee’s goals in promulgating Rule 23(f). In part, Rule 23(f)
was created to achieve early resolution of class certification
questions in a convenient manner for litigants and the courts.213
Despite the Advisory Committee’s intention, the Fifth Circuit treats
an initial denial of class certification as a declaration that putative
plaintiffs are “obliged to file individual suits or intervene in the class
action.”214 By adopting this position, the Fifth Circuit does more
than incentivize redundant actions; the court’s policy encourages
putative plaintiffs to retain counsel, surely at some cost, simply to
file placeholder actions. The class as a whole may expend large
sums of money on what may be wholly unnecessary, independent
actions simply to avoid a looming time-bar (to say nothing of the
additional administrative costs that the district courts will endure in
processing the additional claims). This result is prejudicial and
unjustifiable.
2. The “Pragmatic” Justification of Armstrong v. Martin
Marietta Corporation Post-Rule 23(f).
When the Eleventh Circuit decided Armstrong v. Martin
Marietta Corporation in 1998, the court recognized that Rule 23(f)’s
enactment could allow for continued tolling through an interlocutory
appeal of class certification.215 Considering the Armstrong court’s
recognition of the potentially transformative nature of Rule 23(f),
the silence among circuit courts on the issue post-Armstrong has
212. See Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 520 (5th Cir. 2008).
Because this case is a bellwether, this Comment has largely avoided discussions of
external, Fifth-Circuit-specific decisions that relate in less-than-direct ways to the
instant question. However, it is worth noting that the Fifth Circuit has repeatedly
held that actual judicial notice of class certification denial is inappropriate. See
Pearson v. Ecological Sci. Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1975); Jones v.
Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 923, 937 n.16 (5th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Circuit’s
holdings in Taylor, Pearson, and Jones place putative plaintiffs in an especially
difficult position because certification denials serve as a “declaration” that they are
no longer parties, yet this declaration must not be rendered through actual notice.
There is serious incongruity in the notion that putative plaintiffs are somehow put
on notice that they are not parties to an action when class certification is denied,
yet no actual notice is to be given. The Taylor court made no effort to reconcile
these contradictory rulings.
213. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amends.,
subdiv. (f).
214. See Taylor, 554 F.3d at 520.
215. See Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1389 n.35 (11th
Cir. 1998) (en banc).
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been alarming. The Eleventh Circuit has yet to revisit the question
of tolling through a Rule 23(f) appeal, and neither of the two circuit
courts that have examined the question since 1998 has considered
the issue.216 Now, 13 years after Rule 23(f)’s enactment, a serious
reevaluation of Armstrong’s logic is needed.
In a pre-Rule 23(f) context, Armstrong’s pragmatic reasoning is
sound. Because of the de facto absence of interlocutory review217
and the practice of appealing class certification decisions after final
judgment,218 extending tolling though a final ruling on class
certification would often grant a putative plaintiff years of tolling.
Thus, putative plaintiffs could prejudice defendants by reviving
“claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.”219
Though the Armstrong court’s suggested mechanism for protecting
putative plaintiffs could result in some “unnecessarily costly
litigation,”220 the balance struck between protecting plaintiffs and
defendants was reasonable.
Armstrong’s pragmatic reasoning, though persuasive at the time,
is now antiquated. Rule 23(f) was promulgated because of the legal
and practical difficulties inherent in waiting until final judgment to
appeal class certification decisions.221 Rule 23(f) was intended to
afford litigants “timely and meaningful review of class certification
orders.”222 To protect parties from untimely interlocutory attempts
to revisit class certification, Rule 23(f) allows only 14 days to
appeal, and circuit courts are expected to “act quickly in making the
preliminary determination whether to permit appeal.”223 It is safe to
say, as a predicate matter, that Rule 23(f) significantly changed the
postcertification denial appellate landscape.
The Armstrong court was not, however, willing to accept that
Rule 23(f) would change its analysis on its face; the court’s
216. See Stone Container Corp. v. United States, 229 F.3d 1345, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2000); Taylor, 554 F.3d at 519–21. The Stone Container court was, to its
credit, presiding over an action in the Court of International Trade, where Rule
23(f) is inapplicable. Stone Container, 229 F.3d at 1355.
217. See supra Part I.B.2; Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1385–88.
218. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1388 (citing Thomas E. Willging, Laural L.
Hooper & Robert J. Niemic, An Empirical Analysis of Rule 23 to Address the
Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 170 (1996)).
219. Id. (quoting Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S.
342, 348–49 (1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
220. Id.
221. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 16 (comments of Irving R. Segal); id. at 17
(comments of Patrick E. Maloney).
222. Id. at 17 (internal quotation marks omitted) (comments of Patrick E.
Maloney).
223. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amends., subdiv. (f).
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concession was predicated on an actual increase in the number of
interlocutory appeals that the circuit courts entertained.224 Based on
available data, this condition has been met. As the Erhard study on
Rule 23(f) has shown, circuit courts are entertaining interlocutory
appeals of class certification decisions at a far greater rate.225 The
number of Rule 23(f) appeals that the circuit courts heard in the
three and a half years after the rule’s promulgation is roughly
double the combined amount of interlocutory appeals and
mandamus petitions entertained in the decade prior to Rule 23(f)’s
enactment.226 The data also suggest that the frequency of published
Rule 23(f) opinions increased every year for the first three years
after Rule 23(f)’s promulgation.227 The dramatic increase in
interlocutory appeals of class certification decisions, coupled with
Rule 23(f)’s goals of encouraging and expediting interlocutory
appeals, suggests that the need to continue tolling until final
judgment to finalize class certification questions, as posited in
Armstrong, is simply an artifact of the pre-1998 appellate
landscape.228
3. Appellate Asymmetry
Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2 of this Comment discuss particular
issues present in the “representative” and “pragmatic” theories of
postcertification denial tolling, respectively. However, as recent
jurisprudence shows, an overarching flaw remains in the cases
advancing the general rule that tolling ceases upon the denial of
class certification. One of the most important recent decisions in
Rule 23 jurisprudence came in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes.229
Wal-Mart involved a class action brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 that purported to represent 1.5 million
plaintiffs.230 The Northern District of California certified the
class,231 and a divided en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed
224. Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1389 n.35 (11th Cir.
1998) (en banc).
225. See Erhard, supra note 75, at 184–87 (Table 1); see also supra Part I.B.4.
226. See Erhard, supra note 75, at 184–87 (Table 1); NIEMEYER, supra note
69, at 20 (comments of John L. McGoldrick); see also supra Part I.B.4.
227. See Erhard, supra note 75, at 171–72.
228. The Armstrong court’s discussion of the uncertainty that can result from
extending tolling beyond the denial of class certification is discussed infra Part
II.A.2.
229. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
230. Id. at 2547.
231. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 188 (N.D. Cal 2004),
aff’d, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
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after Wal-Mart took a Rule 23(f) appeal.232 The Supreme Court
reversed, denying class certification.233
The substance of the Supreme Court’s decision is beyond the
scope of this Comment. Nevertheless, Wal-Mart demonstrates the
arbitrary consequence that flows from the Taylor–Armstrong
cessation of tolling after certification denial. Under Taylor, for
example, reliance on the named plaintiff is proper unless the district
court denies certification.234 Applying the Taylor rule in Wal-Mart,
tolling continued for all putative plaintiffs through (1) the successful
motion for class certification filed with the district court, (2) a Rule
23(f) appeal and hearing at the Ninth Circuit, (3) an en banc
rehearing, (4) a certiorari petition, and (5) ultimate defeat at the
United States Supreme Court, simply because of the initial ruling on
class certification. Yet if the certification decisions in Wal-Mart
were reversed—i.e., class certification was repeatedly denied until
the Supreme Court granted certification—then putative plaintiffs
would have been forced to file individual actions at untold cost, seek
a discretionary stay,235 or both simply to avoid the running of the
relevant statute of limitations.236 The current model forces putative
plaintiffs to expend additional resources simply to monitor the Rule
23(f) proceedings237 and injects uncertainty into the proceedings due
to the district court’s initial denial of certification.238
B. The Inadequacy of District Court Efforts to Protect Plaintiffs
Recognizing the potential prejudice to plaintiffs that can result
when tolling does not continue through a Rule 23(f) appeal, two
district courts have suggested extending tolling through the
pendency of Rule 23(f) appeals when (1) a Rule 23(f) appeal is
sought and (2) a stay is attained.239 These courts have extended
232. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc),
rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
233. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556–57.
234. See Taylor v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 554 F.3d 510, 520 (5th Cir. 2008).
235. Or, perhaps, stays. Under the National Asbestos Workers model,
discussed in Part II.B, there is no clear jurisprudential answer on whether a
plaintiff would need to acquire another stay after defeat at the appellate level
simply to extend the toll.
236. See infra Part III.B.
237. Via the need to file independent actions to ensure continued tolling after
certification denial.
238. See infra Part III.B.
239. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV
1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000); Monahan v. City of
Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004 WL 758342, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 30,
2004). Of course, not all courts agree that a stay can toll statutes of limitations. See
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greater protections to putative plaintiffs than those afforded by, for
example, the Fifth Circuit. However, the National Asbestos
Workers–Monahan approach for tolling after certification denial
contains numerous flaws. Specifically, the solution depends on a
“merciful” district court, undermines the class action’s efficiency,
and fails to address the complexities of class action strategy.
One of the primary defects of the National Asbestos Workers–
Monahan approach is the reintroduction of a de facto dual
certification requirement. One of the central problems present in the
pre-Rule 23(f) appellate landscape, specifically under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), was the need for the very district court that denied class
certification to certify the same question for appeal.240 As supporters
of the promulgation of Rule 23(f) noted,241 the need for the district
court to recognize a “close call” to attain an appeal requires a
plaintiff to acquire the “blessing of the very district court that issued
the questionable ruling in the first place.”242 Yet, the same dynamic
is present under the National Asbestos Workers–Monahan
formulation because plaintiffs must acquire the toll-extending stay
from the very district court that has denied class certification.243 In
districts that are typically hostile to class certification, putative
plaintiffs near the end of the relevant statute of limitations may
seriously risk a time-bar even if a Rule 23(f) appeal is successfully
undertaken because the likelihood of a stay could be very low.
Further, considering a district court judge’s usual aversion to
reversal,244 she may have an incentive to deny the stay, to allow a
limitations period to run, and to moot the question of class
certification entirely.
Indeed, the need to successfully acquire a stay creates the same
problem observed in Taylor: the inherent uncertainty involved in a
Rule 23(f) appeal and a stay, both of which are out of a putative
plaintiff’s control, undermines Rule 23’s goals of efficiency and
Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1389 n.35 (11th Cir. 1998)
(en banc). There is very little jurisprudence in this area, though district courts
following National Asbestos Workers and Monahan could create to greater clarity
on the issue. No circuit court reviewed the National Asbestos Workers or
Monahan decisions on tolling.
240. Solimine & Hines, supra note 75, at 1551.
241. Which dispensed with the need for district court certification for appeal.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amends., subdiv. (f).
242. NIEMEYER, supra note 69, at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted)
(comments of Miles N. Ruthberg).
243. Nat’l Asbestos Workers, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1.
244. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The ForwardLooking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 78 n.275
(1994).
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economy in litigation.245 A putative plaintiff near the end of the
limitations period must consider (1) if and when the named plaintiff
will attempt a Rule 23(f) appeal and (2) whether the district court
will issue a stay.246 The only way to guarantee continued tolling is to
file an independent action in contravention of the policy goals
underlying Rule 23.247 To the extent that this uncertainty “breed[s
the] needless duplication of motions,” this effect is unacceptable.248
Finally, the National Asbestos Workers–Monahan approach fails
to respond to the complexities of class-action litigation strategies.
For example, what happens under this model when the named
plaintiff chooses to settle upon an adverse class certification ruling?
This common practice249 would wholly deprive putative plaintiffs of
a continued tolling benefit because the National Asbestos Workers–
Monahan theory mandates an attempted appeal.250 Despite the
recognition of a new, liberalized nature of appeals under Rule
23(f),251 tolling would often begin upon a district court’s denial of
class certification.
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE
A. A New Way Forward
The current jurisprudence has simultaneously failed to protect
defendants and putative plaintiffs equally while advancing the
policies of efficiency and economy of litigation set forth in
American Pipe. A new approach should be implemented. Tolling
beyond class certification denial should be tied to Rule 23(f)’s basic
structure, allowing for a clean, consistent analysis and an
evenhanded result.
After a denial of class certification, tolling should extend
through the full 14-day period allowed by Rule 23(f) for an
interlocutory appeal. The toll should continue irrespective of the
named plaintiff’s behavior.252 If the circuit court refuses to entertain
245. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); Crown,
Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350–51 (1983).
246. To wit, plaintiffs within the Eleventh Circuit need to worry about whether
a stay will toll the statute of limitations at all. See Armstrong v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1389 n.35 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
247. See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553; Crown, 462 U.S. at 350–51.
248. See Am. Pipe, 414 U.S. at 553–54.
249. See Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1390.
250. Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV
1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000).
251. See id.; Monahan v. City of Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004
WL 758342, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 30, 2004).
252. That is, settling or electing to proceed individually.
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an interlocutory appeal or the named plaintiff settles253 or elects to
proceed individually without appealing the certification, tolling
should, nevertheless, cease after the 14th day. If the circuit court
elects to entertain the appeal, tolling should continue until final
resolution,254 including writs of certiorari and decisions of the
United States Supreme Court. This approach advances the policies
of Rule 23 identified in American Pipe and eliminates many
shortcomings produced under the current jurisprudence without
prejudicing defendants.
This proposal is based in part on Louisiana’s Code of Civil
Procedure article 596. The Louisiana approach to tolling beyond
class certification denial is unique; it diverges from any tolling
model used by the federal courts or by other state courts. Indeed,
states have largely adopted the rule that a trial court’s denial of class
certification ends a class action’s tolling.255 In a noteworthy
253. In discussing situations wherein a named plaintiff settles yet the action
continues in some manner, it is important to address potential “case and
controversy” complications. Article III limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to
“Cases” and “Controversies.” See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). Arguably, if every named
plaintiff in an action settles after class certification is denied, no case or
controversy would remain. As a result, constitutional issues could arise in granting
continued tolling to putative plaintiffs—such plaintiffs would retain a tolling
benefit from an action without a present, named plaintiff. This argument lacks
merit. The Supreme Court’s decision in United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald,
discussed supra note 164, held that a putative class member could intervene in an
action for the purpose of appealing a denial of class certification, even after all
named plaintiffs have settled. See United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S.
385, 392 (1977). This case confirms that settlement by all named plaintiffs does
not end an action for case and controversy purposes because the intervention by a
putative plaintiff after settlement by the named plaintiff depends, implicitly, on the
fact that there was still a case in which to intervene.
254. Final in this context could include nonappealed decisions by a court of
appeals, nonappealed decisions by a court of appeals sitting en banc, a denied writ
of certiorari, and a decision made by the United States Supreme Court.
255. See, e.g., White v. Sims, 470 So. 2d 1191, 1193 (Ala. 1985) (Alabama);
Rosenthal v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 883 P.2d 522, 532 (Colo. App. 1994)
(Colorado); Albano v. Shea Homes Ltd. P’ship, 254 P.3d 360, 362 (Ariz. 2011)
(en banc) (The Arizona Supreme Court “assume[d] without deciding” that tolling
ceases upon certification denial by a trial court.); Staub v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
762 A.2d 955, 967 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1999) (New Jersey); Walker v.
Polyscience Corp., No. C14-89-00678-CV, 1990 WL 79838, at *2 (Tex. App.
June 14, 1990) (Texas); Hill v. City of Warren, 740 N.W.2d 706, 718 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2007) (Michigan); Columbia Gorge Audubon Society v. Klickitat Cnty., 989
P.2d 1260, 1264 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (Washington); Sproul v. Oakland Raiders,
Nos. A104542, A106658, 2005 WL 1941388, at *21 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15,
2005) (California).
The Supreme Court of Alaska recognized some of the efficiency concerns
discussed in this Comment and held that tolling could continue (1) where class
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departure from the federal and typical state approaches, article
596(A)(3) extends tolling for a full 30 days after a “mailing or other
delivery or publication of a notice to the class” of, inter alia,
dismissal by the named plaintiff, a denial of a motion for
certification, or an appeal that vacates a previous certification.256
The 30-day period begins after the time allowed for an appeal has
passed or when an appeal becomes “final and definitive.”257 Thus, it
is impossible for a claim to prescribe in the period between a district
court’s denial of class certification and an appellate court’s reversal
on the question. This Comment’s proposal is significantly narrower
than the Louisiana approach. First, the automatic tolling period is
much shorter.258 Second, this Comment’s proposal does not require
notice to putative plaintiffs of an adverse class certification ruling.259
Third, automatic tolling is not “stacked” on top of the period for
appeal; rather, automatic tolling ends with the passage of Rule
23(f)’s window for appeal.260
B. A Proposal in Jurisprudential Action
The automatic extension of tolling through Rule 23(f)’s 14-day
period rectifies the inefficiencies that the Taylor and National
certification had been denied and (2) the denying court expressly has authorized
further discovery and another opportunity to seek class certification. Fred Meyer
of Alaska, Inc. v. Adams, 963 P.2d 1025, 1028–29 (Alaska 1998). Notably, the
Fred Meyer decision did not involve an interlocutory appeal, and it is unclear
whether the Alaska Supreme Court would apply the reasoning in a case where
class certification had been definitively denied.
The Ohio General Assembly has adopted a savings statute that extends an
action’s statute of limitations for one year when a plaintiff’s action fails without
consideration on the merits. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.19(A) (Westlaw
2013). This savings period applies in the case of class certification denial. See
Vaccariello v. Smith & Nephew Richards, Inc., 763 N.E.2d 160, 171 (Ohio 2002).
Ohio’s omnibus savings statute, which applies well beyond the class action
context, can hardly be viewed as a response to the specific inefficiency issues
identified in this context.
256. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 596(A)(3) (2012).
257. Id. art. 596(B).
258. Fourteen days compared to 30 days.
259. By not requiring that notice be given to putative class members upon the
denial of class certification, this Comment’s proposal avoids a distinct controversy
in federal jurisprudence. Federal courts across the country have come to very
different conclusions on the propriety of court-rendered notice to putative
plaintiffs where class certification has been denied. Compare Rineheart v. CibaGeigy Corp., 190 F.R.D. 197, 201-02 (M.D. La. 1999), with Pearson v. Ecological
Sci. Corp., 522 F.2d 171, 176-77 (5th Cir.), and Tosti v. City of L.A., 754 F.2d
1485, 1488 (9th Cir. 1985).
260. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 596(B); id. art. 596 cmt. d.
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Asbestos Workers–Monahan models cause and ends the risk of a
plaintiff losing a claim in the period between an adverse class
certification decision and a final disposition of the certification
question. Under Taylor, a putative plaintiff must file a placeholder
action to avoid the running of the statute of limitations; no other
mechanism can suspend the limitations period. Despite the limited
extension of tolling granted in National Asbestos Workers and
Monahan, the inherent uncertainty involved in the dual requirement
of an attempted appeal and a discretionary stay also encourages
placeholder actions. However, if tolling were to continue through
the period in which a Rule 23(f) appeal can be made, there is no
need for a placeholder action whatsoever, either as a last resort for
tolling (Taylor) or as a hedge against the named plaintiff and a
district court’s behavior (National Asbestos Workers–Monahan).261
The 14-day extension of tolling also furthers Rule 23(f)’s goal of
achieving a cost-effective resolution of the class certification
decision because litigants need not file and courts need not process
redundant actions filed for the sole purpose of continuing the toll to
observe an appeal.262
Because the tolling would cease at the end of the 14-day period
where there is neither an appeal by the named plaintiff nor an
intervention and appeal by a putative plaintiff, this proposal
eliminates the fear of plaintiffs sleeping on claims as expressed in
Armstrong.263 The extension of tolling for a minimum of 14 days
does not prejudice defendants. A properly pled class action puts
defendants on notice of the “number and generic identities of the
potential plaintiffs.”264 Because Rule 23(f) provides a definite period
for appeal, defendants are aware of the window for challenging a
denial of class certification and cannot claim surprise from a timely
request for interlocutory relief. Continuing tolling for a minimum of

261. The Louisiana Legislature established an automatic suspension of
prescription for precisely this reason. See id. art. 596 cmt. c (“The provision
created confusion because Article 592(A)(3)(h) authorizes an appeal from a
judgment denying certification and Article 596 does not provide that its thirty-day
suspensive periods are subject to further suspension by the articles on appeal.
Given this uncertainty, a cautious plaintiff's attorney receiving notice of an adverse
ruling on class certification might needlessly file an individual suit for his client
during the period for taking or completing an appeal to avoid a possible
prescription exception.” (emphasis added)).
262. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amends.,
subdiv. (f).
263. Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1390 (11th Cir.
1998) (en banc).
264. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554–55 (1974).
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14 days does not create a cognizable risk of evidence becoming
stale.265
This proposal also lends itself to practical application. The
Armstrong court expressed concern over the extension of tolling in
light of real-world litigation strategies.266 However, an automatic
stay separates tolling questions from, for example, complications
involving the named plaintiff settling after certification denial.267 A
district court’s denial of certification begins a set period for parties
to consider and execute litigation strategies, and tolling can only
continue after a timely Rule 23(f) appeal.
When a Rule 23(f) appeal is entertained, tolling through the
ultimate resolution of the question ends the arbitrary asymmetry that
can result from a district court’s initial decision on class
certification.268 This rule places all plaintiffs and defendants on the
same footing and ends the need for putative plaintiffs to take
additional steps to participate in the appellate process when a district
court denies class certification. Moreover, this approach avoids
novel questions of tolling after a circuit court’s decision.269 A
defendant is no more prejudiced by continued tolling under this
proposal than was the defendant in Wal-Mart v. Dukes; if a
defendant is not prejudiced when she appeals certification through
the Supreme Court, she is equally not prejudiced when a plaintiff
does the same.270
C. The Proposal’s Relationship with Scholarly Literature
1. Scholarly Literature on the Instant Issue
Very little has been written on the relationship between class
action tolling and Rule 23(f). This area of the law is still developing;
as recently as 2010, one scholar, Joseph M. McLaughlin, recognized
that “[t]he intersection of Rule 23(f) and statute of limitations tolling
for class members is emerging as an area of controversy.”271
McLaughlin is one of the few scholars to directly discuss this issue.
After correctly noting that Rule 23(f) is silent on the issue of tolling
265. As a comparison, article 596 of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
extends tolling for a full 30 days after a notice of a final adverse ruling on class
certification. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 596(A)(3).
266. Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1390.
267. Id.
268. See supra Part III.A.3.
269. See supra note 235.
270. See supra Part III.A.3.
271. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 126, § 3:15, at 470.
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and recognizing many of the cases discussed above, McLaughlin
argued that
[t]he better view is that adopted by courts that have
concluded that the highly discretionary nature of Rule 23(f)
appeals, and the uncertainty over whether a putative
representative will even seek an interlocutory appeal under
Rule 23(f), support adherence to the certainty yielded by the
rule ending the toll when the district court denies class
certification.272
McLaughlin’s reliance on the “uncertainty” inherent in Rule 23(f) is
misplaced. As discussed in Parts III.A.1 and III.B, uncertainty as to
the continuation of tolling after a certification denial creates an
incentive to file redundant placeholder actions, an anathema to the
policies of efficiency and economy underlying American Pipe and
Rule 23.273 Uncertainty as to a putative plaintiff’s tolling status is a
justification for an automatic extension of tolling, not an argument
against it.274
Indeed, McLaughlin’s presentation of jurisprudential arguments
supporting the cessation of tolling when the district court denies
certification contains now obsolete justifications. For instance,
McLaughlin quotes Armstrong for the proposition that “[t]he
extended tolling period may be expected to prejudice many
defendants because [putative] plaintiffs will be able to choose when
to file their suits . . . leav[ing] decisions regarding the tolling period
in the hands, not of the court, but of plaintiffs and putative class
members.”275
The Armstrong court rendered this opinion at a time when
attaining interlocutory review of class certification decisions was not
practical, leaving the question until an appeal from final judgment.
Yet, neither the proposal outlined in this Comment nor in the cases
extending tolling during the pendency of a Rule 23(f) appeal allow a
putative plaintiff to ambush a defendant with an untimely claim after
final judgment. Even the National Asbestos Workers decision, cited
by McLaughlin as a case opposed to Armstrong’s central
272. Id. at 471.
273. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 553 (1974); Crown,
Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 350–51 (1983).
274. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 596 cmt. c.
275. See MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 126, § 3:15, at 469 (third and fourth
alterations in original) (quoting Armstrong v. Martin Marietta Corp., 138 F.3d
1374, 1389 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To be
clear, McLaughlin identified this passage as a jurisprudential argument made in
favor of ending tolling upon the denial of certification.

1222

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73

reasoning,276 required a timely Rule 23(f) appeal for continued
tolling.277 Fear of tolling beyond a distant final judgment fails to
recognize the possibilities created by Rule 23(f).
2. A Comparative Approach
This Comment’s proposed rule is bolstered by the five-part
analysis used by the Tenth Circuit in State Farm Mutual Auto
Insurance Company v. Boellstorff278 and developed by Caleb Brown
on another tolling question.279 Brown wrote his article after the
Tenth Circuit weighed in on a putative plaintiff’s ability to claim
tolling after she de facto opts out of a class by filing an independent
action before a ruling on class certification.280 Many courts have
held that a plaintiff retroactively waives a class action’s tolling
benefit when she initiates an independent action after the filing of a
class action but before an initial class certification decision.281 Other
decisions, including the Boellstorff opinion that prompted Brown’s
piece, have held that no waiver of tolling occurs when a plaintiff
files an independent action after a class action is filed but before a
certification decision.282 In arguing that the latter position is correct,
Brown examined the Boellstorff court’s reasoning under five
analytical prongs: (1) the language of the Supreme Court’s decisions
of American Pipe and Crown, (2) the degree to which the Tenth
Circuit’s rule conforms to the representative nature of the class
action, (3) the need to ensure notice to defendants, (4) the need to
balance the protection of plaintiffs with protection for defendants,
and (5) the effect of the new rule on judicial efficiency.283 Though
this Comment deals with a fundamentally different tolling issue,

276. See id. § 3:15, at 470–71.
277. See Nat’l Asbestos Workers Med. Fund v. Phillip Morris, Inc., No. 98 CV
1492, 2000 WL 1424931, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2000); Monahan v. City of
Wilmington, No. Civ.A. 00-505 JJF, 2004 WL 758342, at *2 (D. Del. Jan. 30,
2004).
278. 540 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2008).
279. See generally Brown, supra note 51.
280. Id.
281. See, e.g., Wyser-Pratte Mgmt. Co. v. Telxon Corp., 413 F.3d 553, 568–69
(6th Cir. 2005); Glater v. Eli Lilly & Co., 712 F.2d 735, 739 (1st Cir. 1983); In re
Enron Co. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 465 F. Supp. 2d 687, 715 (S.D. Tex.
2006); Rahr v. Grant Thornton LLP, 142 F. Supp. 2d 793, 799 (N.D. Tex. 2000).
282. See, e.g., Boellstorff, 540 F.3d at 1229; In re Hanford Nuclear Reservation
Litig., 534 F.3d 986, 1008 (9th Cir. 2007); In re WorldCom Sec. Litig., 496 F.3d
245, 254 (2d Cir. 2007); In re Katrina Canal Breaches Consol. Litig., No. 05-4182,
2008 WL 2692674, at *3 (E.D. La. July 2, 2008).
283. See Brown, supra note 51, at 810–15.
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Brown’s five-part test for assessing a proposed extension of tolling
supports its proposed rule.
a. The Language of the Supreme Court
As Brown noted, a close reading of American Pipe and Crown
can lead to multiple interpretations.284 The most relevant language
comes from Crown and states that “[o]nce the statute of limitations
has been tolled, it remains tolled for all members of the putative
class until class certification is denied.”285 Read narrowly, this
statement can be understood as mandating the cessation of tolling
upon a district court’s denial of certification insofar as class
certification has been denied.286 The same statement can be broadly
read as necessitating a final determination of the question, thereby
including appeals. While this language can plausibly support or
reject this Comment’s proposed rule, it is at least worth noting that
the Crown opinion does not foreclose on it.
b. The Representative Nature of the Class Action
Brown next examined the Boellstorff court’s assertion that its
rule comports with the class action’s representative nature.287 By
granting tolling through the entire 14-day period for a Rule 23(f)
appeal, this Comment’s proposed rule places the putative plaintiff in
a very similar position to the named plaintiff after the denial of
certification. Like the named plaintiff, the putative plaintiff may
appeal the decision after intervention or approach the defendant for
settlement purposes with a more accurate understanding of the class
certification question. Most importantly, and again like the named
plaintiff, the putative plaintiff need not immediately act to restart the
toll. This Comment’s proposed rule advances the representative
nature of the class action.
284. See id. at 810.
285. Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983).
286. Id. The Armstrong court argued for such a narrow reading, stating that it
was unreasonable to read the word denied to mean “denied, appealed, denied
again, appealed (perhaps) again, and denied again.” Armstrong v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 138 F.3d 1374, 1382 (11th Cir. 1998) (en banc). The Armstrong court then
pointed to the Crown Court’s statement that disappointed putative plaintiffs may
“intervene as plaintiffs in the pending action” after class certification has been
denied by the district court to suggest that the Crown court never intended to
continue the toll beyond the initial denial of class certification. Id. (quoting Crown,
462 U.S. at 354) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Wells v. FedEx
Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 4:10CV2080 JCH, 2011 WL 1769665, at *4 (E.D.
Mo. May 9, 2011).
287. See Brown, supra note 51, at 811.
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c. Notice to Defendants
Brown also looked at the degree to which the new rule
maintained proper notice for defendants.288 As discussed above and
noted in American Pipe, a properly pled class action complaint will
alert defendants to the “number and generic identities of the
potential plaintiffs.”289 Should a defendant prevail at the trial level
on the question of class certification, she is on notice that a Rule
23(f) appeal may be made within 14 days. Aware of the number and
generic identities of putative plaintiffs and of the window for
intervention and appeal, imagining that a putative plaintiff could
surprise a defendant is difficult, even if the defendant has settled
with the named plaintiff.
d. Balancing “Nontolling” for Plaintiffs and the Risk of Stale
Evidence
Brown recognized that the harm that an extension of tolling
seeks to correct must not come at the expense of forcing defendants
to face stale claims.290 As Calderon shows, the current approach
allows the loss of valid claims simply because a class was
erroneously and initially denied class certification.291 To help avert
this injustice, as well as promote efficient, cost-effective litigation
pursuant to the goals of Rule 23 and the rationale of Rule 23(f), this
Comment’s proposed rule extends tolling for a minimum of 14 days,
creating little, if any, additional risk of stale evidence.292 While
tolling under the proposed rule could continue through a final
decision, a defendant is at no more of a disadvantage than she would
be if she were the party appealing under Rule 23(f).293
e. The Extension of Tolling and Its Effect on Judicial Efficiency
Finally, Brown recognized that any new tolling rule must not
inject inefficiency into Rule 23 proceedings.294 One of the primary
reasons for this Comment’s proposal is to remove the current
288. See id. at 812.
289. See Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554–55 (1974).
290. See Brown, supra note 51, at 812; see also Armstrong, 138 F.3d at 1388
(citing Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342, 348–49
(1944)).
291. See supra Part III.A.1.
292. See supra Part IV.B.
293. See supra Parts III.A.3, IV.B.
294. See Brown, supra note 51, at 814.
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incentive to file redundant actions after class certification denial.295
Indeed, every approach presented in this Comment outside the new
proposal interjects inefficiency into Rule 23(f) proceedings. This
Comment’s proposed rule falls well within this Brown criterion.
CONCLUSION
The class action is an important tool in modern American
litigation. At times, the class action is the only realistic method by
which a group can vindicate a wrong, to say nothing of the class
action’s value as a tool of judicial efficiency. The rule proposed in
this Comment seeks to remedy a defect that has lingered far too long
in jurisprudence. That parties can be ejected from an action based
merely on a district court’s mistaken class certification decision is
evidence enough of the need for change. That the rule undermines
the policies underlying Rule 23 when many of its initial
justifications withered over a decade ago demonstrates the serious
need for a new approach. Whether through the application of this
Comment’s proposed rule or through other means, a correction to
the problems inherent in ending tolling after a denial of class
certification is long overdue.
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